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Abstract 
 
We investigate the political factors involved in the allocation of public investments into 
Turkish electoral districts. In contrast to the general presumption in the literature, we 
argue that the Closed-List Proportional Representation electoral rule is associated with 
pork barrel politics, given the strong reelection motives of the legislators. Using a unique 
data set from Turkey covering detailed individual characteristics of approximately 2,000 
MPs over five legislative periods during 1987–2004, we test this argument and 
demonstrate that the composition of legislator characteristics in a district proxying pork 
barrel engagement such as seniority, education, and former profession, matters 
significantly for attracting investments into specific geographic constituencies. The 
findings also indicate the strong presence of partisan motivations and targeted support for 
core and smaller opposition groups in public investment allocations. We also document 
that a stronger right-wing tendency in the cabinet, a single-party government, and 
fractionalized voter preferences and higher voter turnout in the electorate are all 
associated with increased public investments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The geographic distribution of public investments has been examined not only in the context of 
economic efficiency and equity but also with respect to political motivations. The US, with its 
long history of the single-member district system and powerful individual legislators, has led 
these examinations (Gamm and Huber 2002). Many congressional studies have explored the 
perceived link between legislator characteristics and pork barrel politics, voter responses to 
such activities, and the legislators’ resulting re-election chances (see, among others, Ferejohn 
1974, Feldman and Jondrow 1984, Stein and Bickers 1994, and Alvares and Saving 1997). 
The past decade witnessed a proliferation of studies analyzing pork barrel politics in 
other countries. This meant that the distributive politics theories have been investigated in 
different institutional settings, such as multi-member (vs. single-member) districts, 
proportional vs. majoritarian electoral systems, and coalition vs. single party governments; see, 
among others, Golden and Picci 2008 for Italy, Leigh 2008 for Australia, Cadot et al. 2006 for 
France, and Samuels 2002 for Brazil. More common topics of analysis across the US and non-
US contexts include the role of partisan governments (right-wing vs. left-wing, or Democratic 
vs. Republican), swing vs. core voters, and socio-economic factors in pork barrel politics. 
Using a unique province-level annual panel dataset that covers 67 electoral districts 
over the period 1987 to 2004, this study investigates the role of political factors in geographic 
allocation of public investments in Turkey. The Turkish setting offers several distinguishing 
advantages to enhance the understanding of distributive politics. First, Turkey implements a 
closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral rule, so this paper is one of the first to 
examine distributive politics in this particular setting.1 The conventional wisdom is that the 
                                                
1 A notable exception is Calvo and Murillo (2004), who explore the partisan ties in the electoral market in 
Argentina, a country with the CLPR rule.  
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CLPR rule is associated with little pork because MPs hold no incentives to pursue personal 
votes due to party/leader domination over the list of candidates for elections. We document 
significant evidence against this commonly held presumption. Second, given that under CLPR 
and, more generally, under proportional representation, ruling parties and the government are 
focal actors in pork barrel politics, we explore the role of government type, partisan attitudes, 
and core vs. opposition support in distributive policies. Third, the Turkish case itself. Little is 
known about the legislator nomination process during elections and the surrounding 
parliamentary landscape in Turkey, a traditional NATO ally that exhibits zigzags in domestic 
and international politics raising doubts about its commitment to historical Western linkages. 
The first motivating factor above is worth an elaboration. It is well-established that 
elected officials face strong re-election motives,2 and electoral rules influence the level of 
pork-barrel activity (Lancaster 1986). The single-member district (SMD) system, in which the 
winner in an electoral district is determined by the plurality of votes, encourages politicians to 
obtain personal votes, thereby generating strong incentives to pursue pork barrel politics. 
Conversely, in a multi-member district (MMD) system, where the winners are generally 
decided according to proportionality, the type of party list determines the level of pork barrel 
activity. The MMD system is associated with two types of party list; open list proportional 
representation (OLPR) where voters rank the candidates of a party during the elections, and 
closed list proportional representation (CLPR) where voters vote for a list that was pre-decided 
by a leader or the party. Thus, under OLPR, legislators still hold strong incentives to attract 
personal votes with extensive pork barrel engagement that follows, whereas under CLPR, 
legislators’ incentives to pursue personal votes are much weaker and pork barreling is limited.  
                                                
2 See the recent evidence by Hessami (2018) who, using German municipal-level data, finds that elected mayors 
have stronger electoral incentives than do appointed mayors in that they attract more grants in election years. 
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In contrast to this conventional wisdom, this paper argues that incentives for pork 
barreling still exist under CLPR. We argue that the reelection motive of legislators is not less 
prominent under CLPR and that legislators would have incentives to maximize their chances 
for reelection. We provide not only formal evidence for our argument but also a supportive 
anecdote obtained from an interview with a prominent official of the ruling AKP in Turkey 
relating to the determination of party lists in the two general elections (2007 and 2011). To 
measure the individual legislator characteristics important in pork barrel activity, we construct 
an unusually rich panel data set that includes an array of personal attributes of approximately 
2,000 distinct Turkish MPs over the five legislative periods from 1987–2004. We aggregate 
these data to electorate level to determine which legislator characteristics are associated with 
pork barreling in a given electoral district.3   
Our exploration yields illuminating results on the major role played by distributive 
politics in public investment allocations in Turkey. First, the composition of legislator 
characteristics in an electorate such as seniority, area of education, and former profession, is 
significantly associated with the level of public investments into an electorate. This provides 
evidence for our hypothesis of the presence of pork barreling under CLPR. Next, we present a 
number of other political characteristics relevant to governments and constituencies that play 
important roles in pork-barrel politics. For example, single-party governments uniformly make 
more investments across electoral districts. Additionally, a stronger right-wing representation 
in the cabinet means more public investments across provinces, but with proportionately more 
allocations made to right-wing constituencies. Moreover, electorates with a stronger, smaller 
                                                
3 All provinces in Turkey except Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir correspond to a distinct electoral district. These three 
provinces have 2–3 electoral districts due to their large populations (and essentially for administrative ease of 
handling the elections). For the purposes of this paper, the electoral districts in each of those provinces are merged 
into one, given that the economic variables such as GDP are only available for the province as a whole.  
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opposition party representation are targeted with more allocations. Furthermore, politically 
fractionalized electorates and those with higher voter turnout rates attract more allocations. 
Finally, there is some evidence for the prominence of economic factors in that crisis years 
witnessed lower amounts of investments but that electorates with larger populations attracted 
higher allocations in Turkey. 
Taken together, this is the first study to offer a detailed analysis of distributive politics 
in Turkey around a firmly rooted hypothesis on pork-barrel presence under the CLPR rule and 
using hand-collected data on individual characteristics of approximately 2,000 Turkish MPs in 
the period 1987-2004. Further, we present several findings related to other nation- or province-
level political factors that are at play in the distribution of public investments across electoral 
districts. Luca and Rodriguez-Pose (2015) come close to our study in that they investigate 
distributive politics and regional development in Turkey between 2005 and 2012. Their focus 
is on how provincial economic development and socioeconomic factors predict the geographic 
distribution of public investments. They find that while political influence mechanisms may be 
relevant in the distribution of public investments, the state tends to favor more developed 
provinces rather than channeling the resources to poorer ones.   
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1       Theories of Distributive Politics 
Distributive policies are political decisions that favor a certain geographic constituency. 
The projects are financed through generalized taxation and thus by electorates that cannot 
benefit from the offered services (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981). Distributive politics 
models advocate that elected officials distribute public benefits strategically to get reelected. 
The models are examined in two broad categories. Congressional studies, also called “free 
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competition models”, emphasize individual legislator characteristics and the incentives that 
they face for reelection. It is argued that distributive politics arises in this setting due to 
competition among powerful individual legislators such as committee chairs, members of 
committees, and senior and experienced congressmen.4 The second group of models is known 
as “discretionary allocation models”, focusing on the incentives of political parties to secure 
more seats in the next election (Jarocińska, 2008: 4-5). These are party-based models and 
assume that the ruling party uses its distributive power to maximize the probability of 
obtaining the majority seat in the legislature. It is argued that party leaders have strong 
command over the rank-and-file members and, hence, the distribution of pork. It is also widely 
held that parties in power are more effective in pork barreling than are those in opposition due 
to the informational advantages that the former have, leading them to reap disproportional 
benefits of the distributions.  
 Partisan attitudes have also been identified as a significant factor in distributive 
politics. 5  Partisan bias in federal outlays, distribution of sports grants, allocation of fiscal 
resources, and expenditure choices has been shown to be prevalent in various countries, 
including the US, Canada, Australia, and Argentina (Thompson 1986, Alvarez and Saving 
1997, Denemark 2000, Kneebone and McKenzie 2001, and Calvo and Murillo 2004). Partisan 
ties can also be ideological in that right- vs. left-wing governments can favor constituencies 
with their own leaning in economic decision-making (see Arin and Ulubasoglu 2009). 
Another focal point of interest has been “swing” vs. “core” voters. Some studies argue 
that public resources are allocated disproportionately to “swing voter” districts (see Dixit and 
Londregan 1996 for the US, Denemark 2000 for Australia, Case 2001 for Albania, Dahlberg 
                                                
4 See Mayhew (1974), Ferejohn (1974), Johnston (1979), and Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981). Barry 
(1965) argues that ‘strong’ committee members or committee chairmen are prominent pursuers of pork barrel. 
5 Cox and McCubbins 1986; Levitt and Snyder 1997; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Stein and Bickers 1994, 1995.  
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and Johansson 2002 for Sweden, and Kwon 2005 for South Korea), while others argue that 
“core supporter” districts receive the disproportionate allocations (see Cox and McCubbins 
1986 for the US, Milligan and Smart 2005 for Canada, and Jarocińska 2008 for Spain). It is 
generally held that risk-averse politicians favor their own supporters over opposition voters.6 
2.2. Pork Barrel Politics and Re-Election 
Although the US-related literature has investigated extensively legislators’ chances of 
reelection as a result of pork barrel politics, it is not clear whether the connection is firm. Levitt 
and Snyder (1997) find that an expenditure of $100 per individual or a public expenditure of 
$50 million per electoral district leads to an increase of approximately 2% in votes (see also 
Alvares and Saving 1997). However, using data from 1976, 1978, and 1980, Feldman and 
Jondrow (1984) find no relationship between increased expenditure and re-election. In the 
context of Italy and France, Golden and Picci 2008 and Cadot et al. 2006, respectively, find a 
strong effect of resource allocations on re-election of influential politicians. It would be 
plausible to posit that varying chances of re-election due to pork do not mean that legislators 
will not be engaged with the ‘homestyle politics’, and it is likely that their re-election motives 
and efforts will be maintained regardless of posterior outcomes. 
2.3.       Electoral Rules and Pork Barrel Politics 
It is widely held that electoral systems and rules affect distributive politics through 
influencing the politicians’ and voters’ incentives.7 Lancester (1986, p. 72) provides a chart of 
electoral systems and the expected level of homestyle. The intensity of pork barreling is 
                                                
6 Another theory which is highly related to pork barrel politics is the opportunistic political business cycles 
theory. Supporting this link, Schady (2000) and Kwon (2005) find that public expenditures increased in pre-
election periods in Peru and South Korea, respectively. Horiuchi and Saito (2003) show similar effects in the 
context of Japanese reforms during 1991-94. 
 
7  A large body of literature connects electoral rules to economic outcomes. See Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and 
Rostagno (2002) on public spending, Lizzeri and Persico (2001) on public goods, and Chang (2005) on 
corruption. 
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strongest in the SMD system and decreases over the spectrum of MMD-PR, MMD-PR (large 
districts), and at-large systems.8 In an SMD system, the plurality of votes required for an 
electoral district encourages legislators to pursue their interests independently, while in an 
MMD system, legislators rely on the party for ballot access. Given that several MPs are to be 
elected per district, this typically generates the free rider and accountability problems (Hillman 
2009). As a result, pork is expected to be less extensive in the MMD system. Likewise, 
majority/plurality, multi-member plurality, single transferable vote, and mixed systems are 
associated with different levels of pork barrel politics. See Lancaster and Patterson 1990, 
Stratmann and Baur 2002, Herron 2002, and Pekkanen et al. 2006.9 
The level of pork is also expected to differ across different rules within the MMD 
system. The proportional representation (PR) system generally specifies two different party 
lists in elections: OLPR and CLPR. Under OLPR, candidates’ ranks are determined during the 
elections by preferences specified on the electoral ballot, whereas under CLPR, voters vote for 
a list that was pre-decided by a leader or the party (Pereira and Renno 2003). Thus, it is argued 
that OLPR stimulates competition among the candidates of the same party for a higher rank on 
the ballot, thus generating incentives to attract public resources to their districts. When the list 
is closed, legislators have no incentive to obtain personalized support in their districts 
(Shugart, Valdini and Suominen 2005, and Sieberer 2010). Overall, the link between 
legislators and voters is considered to be weak under CLPR.  
 
 
                                                
8  The SMD system is often associated with a majoritarian electoral system and MMD with a proportional 
representation system. 
9 A further dimension is introduced by Golden and Picci (2008), who argue that in the SMD system, if the 
governing parties are strong in a locality, marginal districts will get more public expenditures, whereas if they are 
weak, safer districts will receive more. See also Herron (2002) for an earlier separation along these lines. 
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3. THE TURKISH CONTEXT 
3.1.      Closed-List Proportional Representation and Pork Barrel Politics 
We hypothesize that pork will be a part of intra-party politics under CLPR, rather than 
being non-existent or weak due to the assumed shallow competition among candidates over the 
electoral ballot. While we agree that the PR systems are characterized by party-domination10 
and a relatively strong focus on national issues, we also emphasize that the legislators’ desire 
to get reelected is not less prominent under the CLPR system. A common fact in party-based 
systems is that the MPs who want to get reelected use pork barrel projects as a means of 
remaining visible to the party leadership. Experience shows that invisibility in this setting 
means death. This argument is consistent with Besley (2006), who, in the context of political 
agency models, argue that elected public officials have strong incentives to exert efforts to get 
re-elected, which would make them appealing to voters. The party center is more likely to 
nominate such “entrepreneurial” MPs in the upper ranks,11 while inactive MPs are more likely 
to be eliminated from the party list. We have obtained anecdotal evidence supporting this point 
through an interview with a very high-ranking official of the ruling AKP in Turkey, who had 
significant influence on the party list in the 2007 and 2011 elections. His views have also been 
corroborated by three other opposition MPs.12  
More formally, the ruling AKP obtained similar numbers of parliamentary seats in the 
2002, 2007, and 2011 elections (between 326 and 367 of 550). Remarkably, around one-third 
of the MPs from each of the previous periods were not re-nominated for the 2007 and 2011 
elections. Similarly, of the 177 MPs elected in 2002 of the main opposition party, center-left 
                                                
10 The possibility of MPs behaving against the party lines under the PR rule has been raised by Denemark (2000), 
Herron (2002), and Haspel, Remington, and Smith (1998), though in relation to mixed systems.  
11  Another reason for MPs having greater chances of re-nomination is having fully obeyed the party discipline, 
but this does not necessarily preclude pork barreling. 
12 The transcripts from inteviews with the party official and the other MPs are available upon request. 
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CHP, only 53 were re-elected in 2007 of the 112 seats that the party secured. Over our sample 
period, of the 52 MPs of the center-right DYP elected in 1987, only 16 were reelected in 1991, 
when the party obtained a total of 177 seats. Likewise, of the 99 MPs of the center-left SHP 
elected in 1987, only 27 were reelected in 1991, when the party obtained 88 seats. The MP 
profiles of the other parties that were represented in the parliament in any two subsequent 
periods are similar. Our argument is that high MP turnover cannot be explained by party 
politics alone and that “entrepreneurship” is likely to be a critical component of re-nomination.  
Another reality is that some MPs attract a block of votes due to their personal 
reputation and that they may be “bought out” by the party center via public investments into 
their districts.13 Another closely related feature of the CLPR system is the MPs’ tendency to 
change parties very frequently (see Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005 for Brazil). The 
presence of too many parties in this system provides the MPs with opportunity to switch 
parties to maximize their objective functions. Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman argue that 
candidates with local powerbases may be able to demand rents and projects for their districts. 
These points have also been verified by our anecdotal evidence in the case of Turkey.  
In summary, we argue that rank on the party list is not completely exogenous to the 
candidate under CLPR because their re-nomination is linked to visibility and 
“entrepreneurship”. Thus, MP characteristics are likely to be relevant for measuring the 
associated pork barrel engagement.  
3.2. Budget Allocations and Pork Barrel Lobbying in Turkey 
Pork barrel politics is closely related to the budget process. Ferejohn (1974) mentions 
the importance of the distribution of power between legislatives and executives over 
                                                
13 In the context of Turkey, for instance, the MPs of the south-eastern provinces tend to exhibit this feature more 
often. These legislators generally tend to be the leaders of the prominent clans in the semi-feudal region. 
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budgetary allocations. Factors such as the authority of the legislative branch to make changes 
to the budget, the involvement of committees in the distribution of allocations, and the 
efficiency of executives in the allocation of allowances are all critical for transferring 
resources to different electoral districts. 
In Turkey, the Planning and Budgeting Committee (PBC) has the authority to prepare 
and amend the budget draft, which is then approved by the legislature to get into effect. 
Proposals from the floor involving changes in budgetary allocations are constitutionally 
banned. Hence, any change, and therefore any lobbying, needs to be made beforehand. The 
Cabinet has a strong say over the allocations, given that the majority of the PBC members and 
the rank-and-file MPs are from the governing parties. Further, the prime minister, ministers, 
interest groups, bureaucrats, and other political actors may attempt to change the allocations in 
line with their own interests. All of these factors make the budget a political document.  
3.3. Political Climate, Voter Profile, and Economic Factors  in Turkey 
Turkey has held generally free elections since 1950. The democratic process saw short pauses 
due to military coups. However, the armed struggle in the Kurdish-dominated south-east and 
the government’s recent domestic and foreign policy choices pose challenges for the country. 
Linked to our core objective in this paper, the Turkish government - historically and over the 
sample period - has exhibited variations in right- vs. left-wing tendencies or single-party vs. 
coalition cabinet structures. It is plausible to expect that these governmental attributes would 
be associated with varying levels of public investments across provinces.14   
                                                
14 The following parties formed the government over the sample period (with their Turkish acronyms): 1987–
1991: ANAP (center-right) single party; 1992–95: DYP (center-right) – SHP (center-left) coalition; 1996–June 
1997: RP (center-right) – DYP (center-right) coalition; July 1997–1998: ANAP (centre-right) – DSP (center-left) 
– DTP (center-right) coalition; 1999–2002: DSP (center-left) – MHP (nationalist-right) – ANAP (center-right) 
coalition; 2003–2004: AKP (center-right) single party.  
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 Voter preferences are also quite dispersed across Turkey. While western provinces are 
more liberal, eastern provinces are relatively conservative. Large cities in the west host 
cosmopolitan voters due to huge migrant stocks. Certain provinces are well-known to be 
strongholds of a particular political party and are politically cohesive. These strongholds may 
be associated with right- or left-wing ideologies.15 Other provinces host a voter profile that 
may exhibit swings of differing degrees during elections. Voter turnout rates also differ across 
provinces. Factors behind varying voter turnout rates include demographic factors, such as 
education, ethnicity, age structure; attitudinal and behavioral factors, such as access to political 
information, strength of partisanship, and feelings of civic duty; and physical factors, such as 
weather and the proximity to polling locations (Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008).16  
Turkey is also a dynamic emerging market economy. The period 1987–2004 witnessed 
an average growth rate of 4.1%, deepening industrial base, and booming trade. However, this 
period also saw financial crises in 1994, 1999, and 2001, each of which was characterized by 
severe recession, hyperinflation, and skyrocketing interest rates. The demographics also differ 
across provinces. Western provinces are socio-economically more developed, while eastern 
provinces feature high unemployment and low income levels. Accordingly, the latter are 
supported by the government’s “prioritized development” program, under which they receive 
higher public investments and benefit from an incentives scheme to attract more private sector 
investments. 
 
                                                
15 Turkey’s voter profile is generally 70% right-wing and 30% left-wing. In the political sense, right-wing parties 
in Turkey have commonalities with Democrats in the US or the Labor Party in the UK, promoting outward-
oriented politics, while left-wing parties generally advocate nationalist views. In the economic policy sense, the 
right- vs. left-wing definition in Turkey generally matches that of the West, in that right-wing parties are more 
pro-capital, liberal, and reformist, and left-wing parties are more pro-labor, statist, and redistributive. 
16 One prominent issue with voter turnout in Turkey is related to the Kurdish southeast, which has long been 
crippled by separatist political and military struggles. There are sometimes initiatives to boycott the elections.    
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1.      Specification 
Our general empirical formulation is as follows:  
                            Ln(Invit)= f(MPCit, LEADERit, PRit, GOVTit, EFit, εit), 
where ln denotes the natural logarithm, Inv is the amount of public investment allocated to 
electoral district i in year t, MPC represents the composition of individual MP characteristics in 
an electoral district, LEADER is a dummy that indicates whether the district hosts a leader 
involved in budget-making, PR is a vector of variables gauging the provincial strength of 
parties, GOVT denotes the type of government, EF is a vector of economic factors, and ε is an 
error term with the structure εit = µi +δit + vit, where µ is province-fixed characteristics, δit is 
province-specific time trend, and v is the random error.  
The MPC vector includes a range of variables proxying the composition of motives and 
skills of the legislators and their ability to remain close to the relevant offices to extract pork. 
To re-iterate our hypothesis, MPs in Turkey, despite the CLPR rule, can still exert influence in 
the allocation of public investments into electorates. To the extent that i) seniority, ii) gender, 
iii) education level, iv) area of tertiary degree, v) former profession, and vi) foreign country 
experience measure the legislators’ proximity to the offices of the PM, the ministers, and the 
PBC chair, these individual MP characteristics can proxy their political influence. 17  To 
measure their composition in an electoral district, we compute the share of these attributes in 
the overall MP body for a district. A wide range of bachelor degree areas, such as law, political 
science, economics, medicine, and engineering, tests whether formal education in a certain 
field is associated with more lobbying. Former professions are also employed along similar 
                                                
17 Golden and Picci (2008) employ average seniority, the ratio of more to less educated, the male-to-female ratio, 
and the ratio of professional politicians to others to measure individual legislator characteristics.  
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lines, including former governor, undersecretary, farmer, academic, CEO, contractor, 
businessman, and economist/banker roles.18 Foreign country experience captures the trait of 
having experienced the outside world.19 Whether this trait converts into promoting allocations 
according to economic principles is an empirical question.20     
LEADER consists of binary variables showing whether the district hosts the seat of i) 
the PM, ii) any minister, or iii) the PBC chair. These agents may favor their own electorates 
given the dominant role of the Cabinet and the ruling parties in investment allocations under 
CLPR. 
PR includes party strength in the electorate, specifically i) the strength of the governing 
party/parties; ii) that of the largest opposition party; iii) that of the other (smaller opposition) 
parties; iv) the government’s relative strength (governing party/parties strength minus that of 
the largest opposition); v) the representative strength of left- vs. right-wing parties, vi) the 
fractionalization of political preferences, and vii) the voter turnout rate. These variables test not 
only the prominence of the ruling parties and the Cabinet in investment allocations under the 
CLPR rule but also the role of voter preferences and the ideological leaning of the 
constituencies in attracting public investments. The variables are employed in alternate 
specifications to prevent multicollinearity. The government’s relative strength is used to test 
how the competition faced by the governing party/parties affects public investments. As noted 
in section 2.1, ruling parties have strong informational advantages in pork barreling over the 
                                                
18 We have eliminated professions such as lawyer, doctor, teacher, priest, and engineer, because they are directly 
related to the area of the bachelor’s degree, i.e., law, medicine, education, theology, and engineering, respectively 
(correlations range between 0.70 and 0.90). Multicollinearity among the bachelor’s degree areas and professions 
otherwise utilized in the models appears to be low, with correlations generally hovering around 0 to 0.10. 
19 This experience generally includes a master’s/PhD degree abroad, but it also includes exploratory visits that are 
long enough to be deemed worthy of mention in the MPs’ CVs. 
20  Econometrically speaking, a range of MP characteristics in the specification helps us proxy what would 
normally be omitted variables due to unobserved MP traits such as ability, entrepreneurship, and risk-taking 
attitude. 
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opposition. However, if the government faces competition from the opposition in a given 
province, it may keep public investments flowing to prevent seat losses in that electorate (see 
Arin and Ulubasoglu 2009 for privatization).  
Note that the variables gauging the provincial strength of parties are based on two 
different indicators: parties’ vote shares in the electorate and the number of MPs representing 
the province in the parliament. The primary motivation behind adopting the latter is that 
strength based on vote share does not exactly map into parliamentary representation due to the 
seat allocation rule (D’Hondt) in Turkey. A second reason is that while vote shares are 
determined every four or five years in elections, presence in the parliament can enable the MPs 
to engage with the budgetary process annually.  
Returning to the PR vector, the fractionalization of political preferences and the voter 
turnout rate in a given province test whether and how political cohesion in a province affects 
public investments. Provinces where political preferences are aligned with the governing 
party/parties may be favored if the allocations are made according to core support or neglected 
if they are made with respect to opposition support. Conversely, electorates with dispersed 
preferences may be allocated more investments given that they may be considered as swing. A 
lack of political cohesion may also mean that the MPs of those provinces are less likely to able 
to lobby collectively, and therefore, such electorates may attract fewer projects. All of these 
factors suggest that the link between political cohesion and the amount of public investment is 
an empirical question. Analogous to the distinction made above, fragmentation in provincial 
political preferences is measured by fractionalization in the vote shares of each party and in 
parliamentary seats. The voter turnout rate (in the previous election) tests whether expressing 
political choices over the electoral ballot affects the levels of public investment. Various afore-
 16 
mentioned motives underlying voter turnout, as well as the turnout rate itself, may force the 
government to pay special attention to such electorates (see also Smart and Milligan 2005).  
Turning to the government-related variables, the GOVT variable denotes, in alternative 
models, i) coalition vs. single-party government and ii) left- vs. right-wing government in year 
t. The core hypothesis here is that the Cabinet is a prominent actor behind the investment 
decisions and that its type may play a role in the allocations. It is expected that single-party 
governments can overcome the consensus problem and thus make more investments. However, 
coalition governments, despite better reflecting the popular opinion, may not necessarily be 
able to agree on projects. In the absence of agreements, projects may disappear from the scene 
altogether, resulting in fewer investments. One may plausibly counter, however, that the 
coalition parties, instead of fighting, may opt to please each party’s constituency and, hence, 
may pragmatically allow all of the proposed allocations. The net effect is an empirical issue.  
The Cabinet may also exhibit ideological bias in the allocation of investments. Right- 
vs. left-wing denomination captures the partisan approach to resource allocation. Right-wing 
governments are believed to place greater emphasis on economic development with a pro-
capital attitude, while left-wing governments are pro-labor and possess a redistributive stance. 
The relative effect of this contrast on public investments is an open question. We utilize the 
interaction terms between the right- vs. left-wing government and the provincial representation 
of right- vs. left-wing parties to examine electoral district targeting based on ideology. 
Finally, EFit includes i) provincial population and GDP, ii) prioritized development 
province indicator (binary), and iii) dummy variables indicating whether the country had a 
financial crisis or an election in year t. Economic determinants of regional allocations typically 
follow a government’s planning problem that is based on efficiency-equity grounds, generally 
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providing solutions that depend on regional population and income.21 Thus, population and 
income in a regression capture the economically optimum levels of investment into a district. 
Crucially, this modelling approach captures the deviations from economically optimum levels, 
which are likely to be due to political factors (Bordignon et al. 2001).  
4.2. Econometric Methodology 
Our baseline estimation methodology is OLS, with province fixed effects and province-
specific time trends controlled. The fixed effects regression eliminates unobserved time-
invariant effects related to provinces, thereby addressing selection that occurs due to time-
invariant factors underlying the economic and political determinants of public investments, 
such as geography, topography, and climate. The fixed effects regression can also address, if 
not entirely eliminate, slow-moving factors that are unlikely to change in the sample period 
(e.g., more liberal electorates produce highly educated MPs, which may, in turn, underlie the 
lobbying or permanent regional differences such as the socio-cultural and political factors 
associated with the Kurdish-dominated region).22 Moreover, controlling for province-specific 
time trends isolates the long-term trajectory of both the dependent and independent variables, 
enabling us to capture the out-of-trend deviations specific to each province, thereby facilitating 
a more reliable attribution of the effects to the explanatory variables.23  
We also take into account the cross-sectional dependence in public investments, given 
that investment in one electorate may affect the allocations into others. In terms of political 
factors, this is the very issue about pork: funds are taken away from one electorate and 
expended on another, given the budget. Additionally, the economies of the Turkish provinces 
                                                
21 See Oates (1972), Castells and Sole-Olle (2005), and Cadot et al. (2006).  
22 However, the downside of the fixed effects approach is that it ignores the cross-province variation. We refer to 
the nature of pork barreling here: projects are attracted to a specific geographic constituency (Stein 1995). Hence, 
the relationship between public investments and political factors within a province over time is a more relevant 
variation in this setting. 
23 We do not control for year-fixed effects, instead we directly control for nation-wide shocks, such as crisis years. 
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are relatively conjoined, in that production, consumption, transportation investments are inter-
linked. Formal tests of spatial dependence indicate the presence of the problem,24 and our 
analysis therefore employs the Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors. Our panel is balanced 
and contains a relatively large T compared to many other studies, indicating that the 
nonparametric correction to the time series covariance matrix estimator should be reliable. 
We also check the robustness of our models with respect to the specification. The 
model of regional investment may involve a lagged dependent variable because most projects 
would be undertaken over a period of more than one year. We employ the system GMM 
estimator to estimate this possible model. In a series of analyses, while autocorrelation is 
generally not a problem, overidentifying restrictions turns out to be an issue. As a solution, we 
employ the long-difference estimator of Hahn et al. (2007). In this case, the overidentification 
problem is overcome if the differencing is done over four lags. We elect not to pursue the long-
differencing approach for two reasons. First, differencing over four lags means that we lose 
several periods in the analysis. Second, the parliament and the government are likely to change 
over a four-year period. Thus, the consequences of differencing over that period are not clear 
in terms of the effects captured. The implication of not utilizing a dynamic term, conversely, is 
that the relationships captured are long term. That is, our models capture pork barrel projects in 
their entirety, rather than only certain portions undertaken in a given year.  
5. DATA 
The public investment data have been compiled from public investment reports 
published by the State Planning Organization (SPO) for the period 1987–2004. 25  These 
                                                
24 The tests are based on Pesaran, Frees, and Friedman-type tests and uniformly indicate the presence of spatial 
correlation in the models. Failing to account for the problem would provide overly-optimistic standard errors. 
25 Consistent data for province-level investment are available in the SPO’s public investment reports for the period 
1980–2004. However, province-level GDP data are only available after 1987, limiting our analysis to the period 
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investments are the provincial allocations into sectors such as education, health, agriculture, 
manufacturing, mining, construction, energy, transport, communications, and tourism, as 
funded by the central government. Project types include schools, hostels, hospitals, roads, 
power plants, and irrigation channels. Provincial GDP and population and the information on 
being a prioritized development province 26  are collected from the SPO and the Turkish 
Institute of Statistics (with the Turkish acronym TUIK). The individual characteristics of 
approximately 2,000 MPs are obtained from their CVs, which were published in the albums of 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Data on party vote shares and parliamentary seats are 
obtained from TUIK. Table 1 includes the variable definitions. 
Of particular interest is the MP profile in the Turkish parliament. During the sample 
period, the average MP age was 47, and the average number of re-elections was 1.67. Two-
thirds of the MPs had bachelor degrees. Of those, 22% studied engineering, 20% law, 18% 
economics, 10% medicine, 6% political science, and 5% theology. The MPs’ former 
professions were 26% director in a public institution, 18% CEO, 15% businessman and 
contractor, 16% lawyer, 8% academic, 5% journalist, 5% farmer, and 2% imam/preacher. In 
addition, about 2% were female, while 87% of the MPs had no foreign experience. 
 6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1.      Composition of Individual MP Characteristics in an Electorate 
Table 2 presents the estimation results, indicating some very robust effects concerning 
the composition of individual MP characteristics in electoral districts as predictors of pork 
barrel activity.  
                                                                                                                                                       
1987–2004. The figures have been converted into real investments using the GDP deflator. The SPO also 
published another set of investment figures for the period 1999–2007 based on different project classification 
criteria and including the investments into multiple provinces. We elect not to use these data for theoretical 
reasons because pork barrel projects tend to be highly particularized for a specific constituency (Stein 1995). 
26 The feature of being a prioritized development province changes over time. 
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Average seniority. The regressions demonstrate that average seniority is significantly 
associated with higher amounts of public investments into an electoral district. Controlling for 
various factors, an average number of reelections for MPs in a district higher by one more 
legislative period is associated with 0.2%–0.3% more allocations annually into that district.  
Average Age and Gender Ratio. Holding average seniority constant, age is estimated to 
be insignificant. However, this insignificance occurs because province-specific time trends in 
the specification capture most of the variation in age. Once these trends are removed, average 
age becomes a very robust predictor of pork barrel activity (unreported). Interestingly, a 
younger MP composition attracts more investments, suggesting that their reelection motive is 
stronger and leading them to be more engaged in lobbying for projects. 27  More female 
representation in a district is associated with more allocations, but this effect is generally 
insignificant. This lack of significance may reflect the patriarchal nature of Turkish society.  
Education Level. It is widely held in the literature that more educated legislators are 
engaged in more pork barrel activity. Tables 2 confirms this conjecture. We find that districts 
that are strongly represented by MPs with master’s/PhD degrees receive significantly more 
allocations (bachelor’s education is the base). In contrast, those with a high school diploma 
attract significantly fewer investments. This result is also observed for holders of primary 
school education, but the coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
Area of Bachelor’s (Undergraduate) Degree. Both the education levels and the specific 
bachelor’s areas are interpreted with respect to the base “other bachelor’s degree areas”. Our 
estimations show that stronger representation by MPs holding a bachelor’s degree in theology 
or political science or, to some extent, in law is associated with lower levels of public 
                                                
27 Unreported regressions show that an electoral district where the average MP age is 10 years younger receives 
about 0.3% more investments per year. 
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investments into a province. Playing with the base category in different models (unreported), it 
is found that an MP composition with engineering, economics, or medical degrees exhibit a 
higher tendency for pork barrel activity than does that with law, education, theology, or 
political science degrees. These results are not terribly surprising because engineering 
graduates might pursue roads and bridges; medical graduates might pursue hospital and other 
health-related investments; law graduates might be willing to see more rules-based allocations; 
theology and education graduates (e.g., former imams and teachers) might be passive actors of 
lobbying; and political science graduates might center their interests on different domains than 
public investments.   
Former Profession. Electorates that are strongly represented by former governors are 
robustly and positively associated with higher levels of public investment. The associated 
coefficient shows that this particular feature is remarkably the strongest indicator of pork-
barrel among all individual MP characteristics. Compared to other professions, being a former 
economist/banker, farmer, journalist, or merchant is associated with significantly higher levels 
of public investment in a district. In contrast, districts that are strongly represented by former 
contractors receive lower amounts of public investments. This finding may sound surprising, 
but it might suggest that former contractors may be involved with lobbying during the tender 
process rather than the allocation process or that these contractors may target nation-wide 
projects rather than projects for their own constituency. Finally, electorates represented more 
strongly by former academic, accountant, undersecretary, director in a public institution or 
CEO, are generally attract insignificantly different level of public investments. 
Foreign Experience. Provinces that are strongly represented by MPs who have 
experience with living in foreign countries or visiting such countries for reasonably long 
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periods of time are robustly associated with lower amounts of public investments. This finding 
may indicate that such MPs find politically motivated factors counter-productive and do not 
pursue pork barrel activities. 
Overall, this body of evidence constitutes a strong empirical support for the link 
between the CLPR electoral rule and pork barrel engagement. 
6.2. Leaders 
Turning to other prominent factors in pork barrel activity in Turkey, Table 2 documents 
that electorates that hold the prime ministers’ seat are generally associated with higher levels of 
public investment. Where significant, this effect corresponds to a 0.3% higher annual public 
investment into the district. However, cabinet ministers and the chair of the PBC do not seem 
to be associated with a different level of public investments into their own electorates.  
6.3. Provincial Representation  
When investigating the effects of provincial representation, we first employ the 
provincial vote share of each party as the measure of local party strength. As noted in section 
4.1, this metric is more likely to capture the supply side of pork barreling. Model 1 in Table 2 
shows that the central government allocates higher amounts of public investment into 
provinces that strongly support the government parties vis-a-vis opposition parties, and Model 
2 reports that provinces that have greater support for (smaller) opposition parties (i.e., those 
other than the major opposition party) receive more allocations compared to those that support 
the government parties. This finding suggests that governments might be considering the 
voters of the largest opposition party to be a difficult group to attract and that the supporters of 
the smaller opposition parties can be easier to manipulate such that higher investments into 
those electorates may be rewarding. Model 3 shows that the government’s relative strength in 
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the province (i.e., the vote share of the government parties minus that of the major opposition) 
is not significantly related to the amount of allocations. This result is anticipated because a 
larger gap between the government parties’ vote shares and that of the major opposition party 
may lead the government to believe that their votes in that province are relatively secure (see, 
however, our related finding below based on MP shares). Model 4 shows that while political 
cohesion based on vote share fractionalization is not significantly related, voter turnout is a 
strongly significant and positive predictor of the amount of allocations.  
Using provincial representation in the parliament as the measure of local party strength, 
the principal finding is that the major opposition party is associated with lower amounts of 
investment compared to governing and smaller opposition parties (Models 5 and 6). In a 
similar vein, a larger gap between the parliamentary seats of the governing and major 
opposition parties for a given district results in a higher amount of allocations into that district 
(Model 7). These findings seem to suggest that MPs of the governing parties use their 
informational advantages to extract more investment allocations overall, compared to the major 
opposition MPs. Finally, as found above, MP fractionalization is insignificant, but turnout rate 
is positive and strongly significant (Model 8). 
An important conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that the government 
targets core and smaller opposition constituencies by allocating more public investments into 
those electorates. However, this finding does not answer whether the type of government, such 
as right- vs. left-wing, makes any difference to public investments or whether the government 
targets any group based on partisanship ties. These questions are explored below.  
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6.4. Type of Government 
Focusing on the type of government, Table 2 shows that cabinets with stronger right-
wing tendencies are associated with uniformly higher amount of public investments across the 
country. Although the statistical significance of this effect is slightly beyond the conventional 
levels in most models (see below, however), where significant, our estimates imply that a 
government fully composed by right-wing parties would make a 0.6% higher investment in a 
given year across all provinces.  
Table 3 keeps the same specification as in Table 2 but changes the type of government 
to a coalition cabinet. Table 3 documents a robust and statistically significant difference 
between coalition and single-party cabinets in that, across a range of specifications, single-
party governments make uniformly more public investments across all electoral districts. This 
difference is estimated to be in the order of a 0.3% higher investment in a given year. Table 3 
also shows that when the government type is defined as coalition vs. single-party, other GOVT 
and PR-related variables retain analogous effects as in Table 2. The only exception is that the 
political cohesion based on vote share is associated with negative amounts of investments.28   
6.5. Ideological Bias 
Next, we analyze ideological bias in Table 4 by adopting interaction terms between the 
right-wing government indicator and provincial representation in otherwise analogous model 
specifications as before. In addition to parties with well-defined ideological leanings of right- 
vs. left-wing, our dataset includes small parties whose leaning is undefined (with a mean vote 
share of 9% in our sample). Using vote shares to measure party strength, Model 1 yields 
                                                
28 All other results regarding MPC, LEADER, and EF are qualitatively and mostly quantitatively analogous to 
those in Table 2. As our preliminary analysis indicated nonlinearity for voter fractionalization and government’s 
relative strength, their quadratics are added to the model (our analysis indicated no other non-linearity in Table 3 
or 2). However, the non-linearity for these two variables seems to arise due to a few outliers in their distribution. 
Hence, the linear term predominantly explains their relationship with the dependent variable. 
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strongly significant coefficients, this derivative implies that first, regardless of the political 
leaning in an electorate, a government composed of right-wing parties annually allocates 
0.65% higher public investment. Second, all else being equal, right-wing governments’ public 
investments into provinces tend to be higher with stronger rightist support in the electorate. 
Overall, considering the mean right-wing vote share of 65% (and that of undefined leanings to 
be 9%), a fully right-wing cabinet makes, on average, a 1% higher investment per annum to 
support its ideological constituency. 29  This result strongly confirms that right-wing 
governments provide core support based on ideological ties. 
 Model 2 offers another substantive finding. In an effect that is significant at 5%, right-
wing governments allocate higher investments into electorates where ideological cohesion is 
stronger, as shown by the related interaction term between right-wing government and bi-
partisan vote share (i.e., total right-wing share and total left-wing vote share) fractionalization. 
That is, right-wing governments target ideological strongholds, whether right or left.30 Such a 
strategy is consistent with the twin objective of supporting the core ideological constituency 
and breaking up the opposition strongholds on the part of the right-wing governments.  
                                                
29 With the maximum right-wing vote share of 91% in our sample (Rize province in 1995-1999), this amount 
increases to a 1.7% higher allocation per year. Consider also the derivative 
GovtRightwing
rightVoteshare
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_*2.1
_
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. This derivative suggests that pure right-wing support does 
not attract investment into an electorate but does so only when the government is right-wing. 
 
30 The Turkish political landscape features more right-wing strongholds than left-wing. The former are typically in 
Central and Eastern Anatolia (such as Konya, Kayseri, Erzurum, Malatya, and Yozgat provinces), while the latter 
are in Western and North-Eastern Turkey (including provinces like Izmir, Mugla, Eskisehir, and Edirne). Some 
Kurdish provinces (such as Bitlis and Urfa) can also be considered right-wing strongholds, but this designation 
depends on which party the local feudal leader leans towards during an election. 
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Considering MP share to be a measure of party strength, Model 3 yields only weakly 
significant results on the core support based on partisan ties, but Model 4 strongly documents 
the ideological cohesion of parliamentary seats for an electorate matters for public investments. 
More specifically, the coefficients in GovtRightwing
WingMPFrac
inv
_*023.2876.1
_
)ln( +−=∂
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imply that an ideologically cohesive (fractionalized) MP profile on the floor is associated with 
a lower (higher) amount of public investments under a left-wing government, whereas a fully 
right-wing cabinet nullifies this effect.  
To summarize the evidence presented so far, right-wing governments target voters, 
specifically both the right-wing voters in any electorate, as well as the ideological strongholds. 
However, left-wing governments target neither the right-wing nor the left-wing voters. This 
finding may suggest that right-wing parties in the government hope to earn votes from any 
ideology, whereas left-wing parties may think that voters are already loyal ideologically, such 
that left-wing constituencies can be retained easily but right-wing votes cannot be attracted 
under any circumstance; thus, voter targeting is not something worth pursuing. 
6.6. Economic Factors 
Table 2 shows that among the economic factors, the population of a province is the 
most important factor related to the level of provincial public investment. Our estimates imply 
that an increase in the provincial population of 1% increases the annual public investment by 
up to 1.7%, depending on how political factors are defined in the model. An additional 
important factor is the crisis year. Crisis years are uniformly negatively related to the level of 
public investments across the provinces (note that crisis year is a national variable). Crises 
seem to hamper the allocations by approximately 0.2% across provinces in the relevant year. 
Likewise, the income of the province is negatively related to the level of public investment, but 
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this effect is significant at only approximately 20%. The negative coefficient may imply that as 
provincial income increases, private sector investments become more prominent. Prioritized 
development province is estimated using uniformly positive coefficients, implying that such 
provinces annually receive 0.2% higher allocations from the central government; however, the 
effect again falls short of being significant. Finally, there is no statistically significant evidence 
for a change in public investments across all districts during election years.31  
Appendix A1 reports the results only with economic factors ignoring the political 
factors and using a range of error term assumptions (i.e., pooled regressions, and fixed effects 
regressions without and with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors). Focusing on columns (8) and (9) 
that adopt comparable fixed effects regressions to Table 2 where cross-sectional dependence is 
accounted for, we find that identifying statistically significant effects of log population and 
crisis years are only possible when political factors are modeled in the regression.  
6.7. Sensitivity Checks 
In unreported regressions, we conducted several robustness checks. These include repeating 
the estimations by excluding the three major cities (Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir) from the 
sample, by removing each of the seven geographical regions one at a time to observe whether 
any region is driving the results (including the provinces of the Kurdish-dominated south-east), 
and by excluding the top and bottom 10% of the investment observations in case of outliers. 
None of these perturbations alter the main thrust of our findings regarding political factors.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Following a series of examinations centered on the US, theories of distributive politics 
have recently been applied to other countries. Common topics of analysis across both US and 
                                                
31 It is possible that the election period features a greater increase in transfer and personnel payments that is in line 
with the opportunistic political business cycles theory, rather than projects that are subject to pork barrel. Note 
also that we are looking at particularized investments only and therefore ignore multiple-province investments. 
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non-US settings have included party- vs. individual-based incentives in the pursuit of pork 
barrel activities, the link between electoral rules and pork barrel activity, partisan/ideological 
bias in the allocation of investments, and support for core vs. swing voters in public 
investments.   
This paper investigates distributive politics in the context of Turkey. Using an 
unusually rich panel data set that covers the detailed individual attributes of nearly 2,000 MPs 
over the five legislative periods during 1987–2004, as well as an array of political and 
economic variables across 67 electorates, the paper makes three important contributions to the 
literature. First, this paper is one of the first to analyze pork barrel politics under a closed-list 
proportional representation (CLPR) electoral rule, which Turkey implements. Several 
arguments posit that, in contrast to other electoral rules such as the single-member district or 
open-list proportional representation, in which legislators have strong incentives to garner 
personal votes, the CLPR is associated with weak pork barrel activity due to party or leader 
domination in investment allocations and nomination of the MPs for elections. We hypothesize 
that the underlying motive of legislators in pursuing pork, i.e., reelection, is not less prominent 
under the CLPR electoral rule. The paper utilizes the individual characteristics of 
approximately 2,000 distinct Turkish MPs in a model of provincial public investment to 
empirically test the existence of pork barrel under the CLPR rule. The second contribution of 
the paper is to explore government-related incentives and ideological ties in pork barrel. These 
explorations include an examination of the behavior of single-party vs. coalition governments, 
right- vs. left-wing dominated cabinets, and core vs. opposition support in public investments. 
Finally, the analysis of Turkey itself is important. Little is known in the formal academic 
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literature about the parliamentary landscape and the legislator nomination process in Turkey, a 
traditional Western ally that could suffer from zigzags in domestic and international relations. 
Controlling for economic factors, political factors appear to be extremely important in 
the allocation of public investments into electorates in Turkey. We obtain several conclusive 
results. First, the composition of legislator characteristics in an electorate such as seniority, 
education, and former profession, is documented to be significantly related to the amount of 
public investments into their electorates. Thus, our hypothesis as to the presence of pork barrel 
activity under CLPR is supported by the data. Second, single-party (vs. coalition) governments 
are found to make uniformly more investments across electoral districts. Third, a stronger 
right-wing (vs. left-wing) representation in the cabinet results in more provincial investments 
across the country, but with proportionately more allocations made to right-wing 
constituencies. Additionally, electorates with smaller opposition constituencies are targeted 
with more allocations. Electoral districts where the largest opposition party is stronger are not 
targeted. Finally, we find that politically fractionalized electorates and those with higher voter 
turnout rates attract higher levels of public investments. 
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Table 1. Variable Names and Definitions 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
EF: Economic Factors 
Log Population Log population of the province 
Log GDP Log GDP of the province  
Prioritized Development Province 1 if a development priority province, otherwise 0  
Crisis Year 1 if country in crisis, otherwise 0 (national variable) 
Election Year 1 if country has election, otherwise 0 (national variable) 
LEADER: Leaders 
Prime Minister Seat 1 if the prime minister represents the province, otherwise 0 
Minister Seat Number of ministers representing the district  
Chair of the Planning and Budget Commission 
 
1 if the chair of the planning and budget commission 
represents the province, otherwise 0  
GOVT: Type of Government  
Coalition Government 
 
1 if the government is a coalition government, otherwise 0  
(national variable) 
Right-Wing Government Share of ministries held by right-wing parties in the 
government (national variable) 
Left-Wing Government Share of ministries held by left-wing parties in the 
government  (national variable) 
PR: Provincial Representation  
Government’s Relative Strength in a Province Two measures: 1. The total vote share of the government 
party (parties) in the province minus the vote share of the 
major opposition party in the province; 2. the same with the 
share of MPs in total number of MPs in the province 
Representative Strength of a Party in a Province 
 
Two measures: 1. party’s vote share in the province in the 
previous elections; 2. the number of MPs of the party in the 
province, as obtained in the previous elections.  
Right-Wing Representation in a Province Two measures: 1. total vote share of right-wing parties in 
the province; 2. share of right-wing MPs in the total number 
of MPs in the province  
Left-Wing Representation in a Province Two measures: 1. total vote rates of left-wing parties in the 
province; 2. share of left-wing MPs in the total number of 
MPs in the province  
Voter Fractionalization in a Province Two measures: 1. Herfindahl index obtained from vote 
shares; 2. Herfindahl index obtained from the share of MPs 
out of the total number of MPs 
Voter Turnout Rate The rate of participation in previous elections 
MPC: Individual MP Characteristics (all the MPC characteristics below except the first three are utilized in 
the regressions as “share in total number of MPs” to represent the composition of MPs in the province)  
Female/Male Ratio 
 
Ratio of female to male legislators in the province 
Average Seniority Average number of re-elections in a given legislative period 
(considering also individual reelection histories of the MPs 
before the sample period) 
Average Age Average MP age in the province 
Education Level Primary School, High School, University, Master’s/PhD 
Graduate 
Area of Bachelor’s Degree Theology, Law, Economics, Political Science, Medicine, 
Education, Engineering, Other  
Former Profession Former Businessman, Academic, Contractor,  Journalist, 
Farmer, Economist/Banker, Accountant, Governor, 
Undersecretary, CEO, Director in the Public Sector, Other 
Foreign Experience 1 if been abroad for reasonably long, otherwise 0 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MP Composition
Avg. Seniority 0.192** 0.185** 0.166* 0.112* 0.157* 0.144* 0.150* 0.106*
(2.305) (2.204) (1.860) (1.781) (1.897) (1.805) (1.766) (1.844)
Average MP Age -0.00495 -0.00592 -0.00103 -0.00388 0.00278 0.00153 0.00250 -0.00394
(-0.770) (-0.900) (-0.152) (-0.594) (0.393) (0.190) (0.392) (-0.536)
Female/Male Ratio 0.472 0.417 0.395 0.567* 0.301 0.268 0.273 0.516
(1.375) (1.237) (1.056) (1.759) (0.800) (0.681) (0.711) (1.565)
Primary School Graduate (SMP) -0.238 -0.335 -0.226 -0.124 -0.320 -0.322 -0.334 -0.145
(-0.589) (-0.865) (-0.577) (-0.280) (-0.837) (-0.828) (-0.878) (-0.321)
High School Graduate (SMP) -0.705** -0.721** -0.766** -0.554* -0.865** -0.932*** -0.912*** -0.522*
(-2.573) (-2.566) (-2.676) (-2.036) (-2.783) (-3.069) (-2.920) (-1.787)
Master-PhD Degree (SMP) 0.721*** 0.573*** 0.748*** 0.735*** 0.768*** 0.697*** 0.732*** 0.683***
(4.891) (3.735) (4.706) (5.340) (5.371) (5.940) (4.891) (5.250)
Theology Graduate (SMP) -1.580*** -1.595*** -1.566*** -1.289*** -1.471*** -1.508*** -1.478*** -1.308***
(-4.731) (-4.989) (-4.686) (-3.801) (-4.345) (-4.222) (-4.490) (-3.618)
Law Graduate (SMP) -0.183 -0.382* -0.138 -0.146 -0.132 -0.201 -0.169 -0.155
(-1.013) (-2.050) (-0.681) (-0.719) (-0.627) (-1.075) (-0.806) (-0.811)
Economics Graduate (SMP) 0.0720 -0.0472 0.0158 0.151 -0.0736 -0.123 -0.110 0.192
(0.412) (-0.247) (0.0909) (0.876) (-0.427) (-0.756) (-0.639) (1.120)
Pol. Sci. Graduate (SMP) -1.016*** -1.164*** -0.962*** -0.680*** -0.905*** -0.956*** -0.925*** -0.693***
(-5.068) (-5.795) (-4.431) (-2.973) (-4.430) (-4.868) (-4.196) (-3.301)
Medicine Graduate (SMP) -0.133 -0.241 -0.152 -0.190 -0.156 -0.241 -0.201 -0.202
(-0.752) (-1.295) (-0.835) (-1.031) (-1.013) (-1.700) (-1.234) (-1.148)
Education Graduate (SMP) -0.105 -0.189 -0.133 -0.156 -0.178 -0.217 -0.204 -0.165
(-0.434) (-0.680) (-0.516) (-0.466) (-0.629) (-0.754) (-0.703) (-0.494)
Engineering Graduate (SMP) 0.443* 0.285 0.398 0.133 0.315 0.312 0.305 0.142
(1.943) (1.076) (1.704) (0.540) (1.270) (1.273) (1.271) (0.598)
Former Businessman (SMP) 0.536 0.437 0.587 0.668* 0.578 0.518 0.543 0.668*
(1.466) (1.182) (1.568) (1.765) (1.531) (1.434) (1.460) (1.819)
Former Academic (SMP) -0.0729 -0.0403 -0.0937 -0.559** -0.130 -0.108 -0.123 -0.559**
(-0.249) (-0.134) (-0.333) (-2.267) (-0.463) (-0.372) (-0.428) (-2.196)
Former Contractor (SMP) -0.640** -0.743** -0.650** -0.488* -0.648** -0.653** -0.649** -0.502*
(-2.500) (-2.863) (-2.489) (-1.773) (-2.303) (-2.352) (-2.317) (-1.810)
Former Journalist (SMP) 0.847** 0.644 0.817** 0.835** 0.734** 0.756** 0.737** 0.879**
(2.453) (1.711) (2.407) (2.705) (2.333) (2.266) (2.383) (2.756)
Former Merchant (SMP) 0.391* 0.305 0.438* 0.536** 0.521** 0.491** 0.516** 0.463*
(1.834) (1.375) (2.040) (2.269) (2.329) (2.140) (2.344) (2.108)
Former Farmer (SMP) 0.792** 0.907*** 0.777** 0.496 0.773** 0.689** 0.726** 0.531
(2.765) (3.462) (2.750) (1.409) (2.689) (2.452) (2.448) (1.609)
Former Economist/Banker (SMP) 0.779** 0.589 0.750** 0.0927 0.716** 0.620** 0.661* 0.0438
(2.450) (1.576) (2.265) (0.387) (2.297) (2.154) (1.986) (0.183)
Former Accountant (SMP) 0.374 0.345 0.420 0.0215 0.453 0.449 0.454 -0.0448
(0.837) (0.802) (0.978) (0.0551) (1.118) (1.073) (1.119) (-0.117)
Former Governor (SMP) 1.824*** 1.895*** 1.785*** 1.159** 1.732*** 1.720*** 1.719*** 1.161**
(4.226) (4.321) (4.119) (2.503) (3.908) (3.916) (3.930) (2.650)
Former Undersecretary (SMP) -0.0638 -0.189 -0.0522 -0.290 0.0410 0.0507 0.0600 -0.352
(-0.168) (-0.474) (-0.130) (-0.774) (0.121) (0.157) (0.176) (-0.894)
Former Director (Public) (SMP) -0.139 -0.129 -0.141 -0.0120 -0.108 -0.170 -0.137 -0.0197
(-0.742) (-0.665) (-0.725) (-0.0515) (-0.523) (-0.806) (-0.682) (-0.0843)
Former CEO (SMP) -0.0783 -0.0211 -0.0511 0.0617 0.0304 0.0477 0.0498 0.0848
(-0.381) (-0.110) (-0.238) (0.317) (0.135) (0.223) (0.231) (0.416)
Foreign Experience (SMP) -0.578** -0.447* -0.607** -0.389** -0.562** -0.549** -0.549** -0.347
(-2.706) (-2.054) (-2.772) (-2.314) (-2.438) (-2.619) (-2.500) (-1.739)
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Table 2. Pork Barrel Politics in Turkey (18., 19., 20., 21. and 22. Legislative Periods, 1987-2004)
Right-Wing vs. Left-Wing Governments
Dependent Variable: Log(Provincial Public Investment)
Table continued on the next page....
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Leader
PM Seat (1=Yes) 0.326** 0.240 0.266* 0.274** 0.210 0.193 0.196 0.333**
(2.157) (1.416) (1.794) (2.422) (1.533) (1.427) (1.445) (2.375)
Minister Seat (1=Yes) 0.00474 -0.0194 -0.00800 -0.0128 -0.0265 -0.0324 -0.0316 -0.0102
(0.134) (-0.508) (-0.219) (-0.462) (-0.723) (-0.916) (-0.876) (-0.381)
PBC Head Seat (1=Yes) 0.00314 -0.0471 0.0103 -0.00328 0.00364 -0.0341 -0.0176 -0.0150
(0.0116) (-0.174) (0.0370) (-0.0131) (0.0131) (-0.130) (-0.0634) (-0.0583)
Government
Right Wing Govt. 0.566 0.346 0.684 0.581 0.663 0.670 0.662 0.603*
(1.272) (0.963) (1.450) (1.654) (1.471) (1.522) (1.488) (1.797)
Provincial Representation
Govt Parties (VS) -0.00577**
(-2.705)
Main Opposition Party (VS) -0.00640
(-1.164)
Other Parties (VS) 0.0117***
(3.819)
Govt's Rel. Strength (VS) -0.000888
(-0.496)
Voter Fractionalization (VS) 0.968
(1.222)
Voter Turnout Rate 0.0476*** 0.0450***
(4.067) (4.132)
Govt Parties (SMP) 0.217
(1.214)
Main Opposition Party (SMP) -0.335**
(-2.249)
Other Parties (SMP) -0.0482
(-0.181)
Govt's Rel. Strength (SMP) 0.156*
(1.761)
MP Fractionalization 0.0321
(0.179)
Economic Factors
Log Population 1.741*** 1.796*** 1.776*** 0.864** 1.764*** 1.724*** 1.739*** 0.932**
(3.017) (3.050) (3.046) (2.388) (3.254) (3.197) (3.295) (2.705)
Log GDP -0.241 -0.220 -0.258 -0.146 -0.237 -0.253 -0.242 -0.149
(-1.545) (-1.594) (-1.528) (-1.030) (-1.324) (-1.422) (-1.395) (-0.993)
Prioritized Dev. Province (1=Yes) 0.326 0.310 0.284 0.0642 0.223 0.258 0.235 0.0792
(1.139) (1.255) (1.011) (0.230) (0.841) (1.002) (0.853) (0.292)
Crisis Year (1=Yes) -0.201* -0.159 -0.227* -0.224** -0.239* -0.230* -0.235* -0.220**
(-1.750) (-1.404) (-1.959) (-2.561) (-2.038) (-2.025) (-2.022) (-2.555)
Election Year (1=Yes) 0.0205 0.0250 0.0203 0.0678 0.0323 0.0299 0.0327 0.0601
(0.182) (0.265) (0.166) (0.550) (0.273) (0.253) (0.277) (0.492)
Number of Observations 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206
Number of Provinces 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
MP: Member of Parliament. VS: Vote Share in the province.  SMP: Share of provincial seats in the parliament, 
representing the composition of the legislators in the electoral district. PBC: Plan and Budget Commission.
Government's relative strength is the strength of governing parties minus that of the major opposition. 
Driscoll-Kraay t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Base group for education and tertiary areas is Bachelor Degree in Other Areas, and for profession, Other Profession.
Province fixed effects and province-specific time trends are controlled in the regressions. 
Table continued from the previous page...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Government
Coalition Govt. (1=Yes) -0.293*** -0.209*** -0.341*** -0.294*** -0.322*** -0.351*** -0.325*** -0.304***
(-2.956) (-3.738) (-2.995) (-3.998) (-3.266) (-3.820) (-3.400) (-4.039)
Provincial Representation
Govt Parties (VS) -0.00439*
(-1.831)
Main Opposition Party VS) -0.00679
(-1.250)
Other Parties (VS) 0.0101**
(2.618)
Govt's Rel. Strength (SMP) -0.000836
(-0.345)
Govt's Rel. Strength Sq. (SMP) 2.19e-05
(0.575)
Voter Fractionalization (VS) -7.926***
(-4.979)
Voter Fractionalization Sq. (VS) 12.58***
(5.531)
Voter Turnout Rate 0.0345*** 0.0344***
(2.967) (3.288)
Govt Parties (SMP) 0.153
(0.841)
Main Opposition Party (SMP) -0.330*
(-2.036)
Other Parties (SMP) 0.125
(0.454)
Govt's Rel. Strength (MP) 0.221**
(2.565)
Govt's Rel. Strength Sq. (SMP) -0.195
(-1.502)
MP Fractionalization -0.235
(-1.319)
Number of Observations 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206
Number of Provinces 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
MP: Member of Parliament. VS: Vote Share in the province.  SMP: Share of provincial seats in the parliament, representing
the composition of the legislators in the district. Government's relative strength is the strength of governing parties minus
that of the largest opposition (based on the number of MPs). MP Fractionalization is the Herfindahl-type fractionalization index
Coalition Gov't is a national dummy while all other independent variables vary by province and year. 
Output suppressed: MP composition in the province, leaders' seat, and economic factors are all included in the regressions.
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Table 3. Pork Barrel Politics in Turkey (18., 19., 20., 21. and 22. Legislative Periods, 1987-2004)
Coalition vs. Single-Party Governments
Dependent Variable: Log Provincial Public Investments
based on the number of MPs in a province. Driscoll-Kraay t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Province fixed effects and province-specific time trends are controlled in the regressions. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government
Right Wing Govt. 0.653** -0.769 0.00360 -0.973**
(2.242) (-1.261) (0.00525) (-2.219)
Ideological Bias
Right Wing Vote Share in Province -0.687
(-1.469)
Undefined Wing Vote Share in Province 3.990***
(3.838)
Right Wing Govt*Right Vote Share in Province 1.197***
(3.447)
Right Wing Govt*Undefined Vote Share in Province -4.574***
(-4.938)
Voter Fractionalization (Wing) -2.061
(-1.599)
Voter Turnout Rate 0.0421*** 0.0396***
(4.709) (4.088)
Right-Wing Govt*Voter Fractionalization (Wing) 2.698*
(2.108)
Right-Wing (SMP) -0.508
(-1.174)
Right-Wing Govt*Right-Wing MPs 0.933
(1.628)
MP Fractionalization (Wing) -1.876***
(-4.227)
Right-Wing Govt*MP Fractionalization (Wing) 2.023***
(3.226)
Number of Observations 1,139 1,206 1,206 1,206
Number of Provinces 67 67 67 67
Driscoll-Kraay t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Right-wing Govt is the share
of ministries held by right-wing parties in the government (national variable)
Voter Fractionalization (Wing) is a Herfindahl index of fractionalization of total right-wing vote shares 
and total left-wing vote shares in an electoral district. Undefined Wing: Neither right, nor left-wing ideology.
MP Fractionalization (Wing) is a Herfindahl index of fractionalization of total right-wing MP seats
and total left-wing MP seats in an electoral district.
Output suppressed: MPC, leaders, and economic factors are all included in the regressions.
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Table 4. Ideological Bias in Public Investments (18., 19., 20., 21. and 22. Legislative Periods)
Dep. Var.: Log Provincial Public Investments
Province fixed effects and province-specific time trends are controlled in the regressions. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES
Log Pop. 0.499*** 0.499*** -0.288 -0.236 0.133 0.499** 0.499** -0.288 -0.236
(5.382) (5.346) (-1.081) (-0.887) (0.487) (2.560) (2.648) (-0.684) (-0.519)
Log GDP 0.459*** 0.459*** -0.554*** -0.668*** 0.856*** 0.459** 0.459** -0.554 -0.668
(6.103) (6.046) (-4.244) (-4.954) (3.662) (2.446) (2.582) (-1.290) (-1.474)
Prioritized DP 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.115 0.113 0.593** 0.236* 0.235* 0.115 0.113
(3.034) (3.015) (0.816) (0.799) (2.465) (1.741) (1.844) (0.532) (0.510)
Crisis Year -0.0349 -0.208*** -0.0349 -0.208
(-0.469) (-3.532) (-0.201) (-1.376)
Election Year 0.0745 -0.0102 0.0745 -0.0102
(1.084) (-0.191) (0.352) (-0.0647)
Constant -6.058*** -6.070*** 13.49*** 13.85*** -4.887** -6.058*** -6.070*** 13.49*** 13.85***
(-8.559) (-8.570) (4.385) (4.520) (-2.552) (-6.472) (-6.442) (4.813) (5.283)
Observations 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206
R-squared 0.365 0.365
Crisis Year and Election Year are national indicators.
39
Prioritized DP is a dummy indicator for Prioritized Development Province and varies by province and year.
t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Appendix Table 1. Economic Determinants of Public Investments
Between 
Effects
Pooled Driscoll-Kraay
Std. Errors
Fixed Effects Driscoll-
Kraay Std. Errors
Fixed EffectsPooled Estimation
Dependent Variable: Log Investment
